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Abstract
Inconsistencies between scientific theories have studied, been by
and large, from the perspective of paraconsistent logic. This approach
considered the formal properties of theories and the structure of infer-
ences one can legitimately draw from theories. However, inconsisten-
cies can be also analysed from the perspective of modelling practices, in
particular how modelling practices may lead scientists to form opinions
and attitudes that are different, but not necessarily inconsistent (from
a logical point of view). In such cases, it is preferable to talk about
disagreement, rather than inconsistency. Disagreement may originate
in, or concern, a number of epistemic, socio-political or psychological
factors. In this paper, we offer an account of the ‘loci and reasons’
for disagreement at different stages of the scientific process. We then
present a controversial episode of the health sciences: the studies on hy-
percholesterolemia. The causes and effects of high levels of cholesterol
in blood have been long and hard debated, to the point of deserving
the name of ‘cholesterol wars’; the debate, to be sure, isn’t settled yet.
In this contribution, we focus on some selected loci and reasons for
disagreement that occurred between 1920 and 1994 in the studies on
hypercholesterolemia. We hope that our analysis of ‘loci and reasons’
for disagreement may shed light on the cholesterol wars, and possibly
on other episodes of scientific disagreement.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates ‘scientific disagreement’, namely situations in which
scientists hold different opinions or theories, or in which they hold different
views about scientific results, or even about the processes to obtain such
results. Disagreement may often, but need not always, lead to mutually
inconsistent opinions concerning various hypotheses. To exemplify our the-
oretical claims about scientific disagreement, we use the recent debate on
evidential pluralism and, more specifically, we focus on the long-standing
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controversy in medicine on the causes and effect of hypercholesterolemia,
also known as the ‘cholesterol wars’.
There are several reasons that motivate investigations of disagreement
between scientists. On the one hand, this extends a closely related debate
in philosophy of science concerning inconsistent theories and what one can
legitimately infer from those. The literature on inconsistencies in science
has been focusing on what happens to a theory (most typically, a theory
in physics) when some of its assumptions contradict each other. Specifi-
cally, what consequences does this entail? By and large, scholars in the field
worked towards a logic of inconsistency. Focusing on inconsistent theories,
rather than on disagreeing opinions or theories of certain scientists, misses
out a host of interesting questions for philosophers of science. For instance,
instead of investigating the root causes of advocating inconsistent theories,
it considers only the end product, i.e. the theory. Also, such narrow focus
may miss a subtle point: different opinions may not necessarily be incom-
patible with each other, but may lead to incompatible conclusions or results.
Also, disagreement may come into degrees, which is a broader issue than the
‘binary’ consistent vs inconsistent one. On the other hand, recent debates
on evidence in medicine have focused on agreement, that is, what is needed
in order to establish a causal claim: typically, scientists use multiple sources
of evidence, which are, at least in principle, of equal importance. In a sense,
evidential pluralism has been occupied with a question about consensus, or
how a community comes to agree on what causes what. Hence, focusing
on what may hinder the scientific community from establishing such claims
broadens the debate on evidential pluralism. Let us develop further.
Consider the debate on inconsistencies in science first. The typical prob-
lem addressed in this literature is the inconsistencies of hypotheses of phys-
ical theories, including cosmology or chemistry. Most often the question
has been about whether theories with inconsistent sub-theories should be
outright rejected or, if not, in what way they may undermine our realist
intuitions (see e.g. Gregersen and Kørregard (1988); Brown (1990, 2002);
Norton (2002)). So, while traditional discussions indeed aimed at finding
a logic for inconsistent theories (Meheus, 2003), some other scholars tried
to frame the debate differently, thereby broadening the focus. For instance,
Smith (1988) tries to shift the focus to the practice of experimental science
in order to understand why inconsistencies may occur. To give another ex-
ample, Nersessian (2002) distinguishes two ways of looking at inconsistency:
the perspective of logic, where inconsistency is seen largely detrimental in
the reasoning process, and the perspective of history of scientific develop-
ment, where inconsistency can play important heuristic roles in the process
of conceptual change.
Smith (1988) and Nersessian (2002), we submit, mark a considerable
broadening of the narrow focus on the logic of inconsistencies. For one
thing, it is an approach more in line with the ‘History and Philosophy of
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Science’ and the ‘Philosophy of Science in Practice’ schools. An important
consequence of this is that potential inconsistencies are not just properties
of theories, but may instead be related to modelling practices, or to the
way modellers phrase a research question or set up an experiment, or to the
complex socio-political dynamics that take place in scientific practice.
This shift of focus in the ‘inconsistency debate’ from logic to scientific
practice offers us an entry point, provided that one broadens the scope:
what is at stake is not merely the inconsistent, logical, status of theories.
The traditional debate on inconsistencies in science mostly focused on ‘ab-
stracta’: the formal properties of theories and the structure of inferences
we draw from theories. This formulation of the problem of inconsistencies
focuses on theories as the main, or even sole, interest of philosophers of
science (see e.g. Boon (2015)) and largely ignores scientific practices and
agents, which may be the root causes for the observed inconsistencies at
the level of theories. What we are interested in, instead, is how scientists
come to form opinions and attitudes that may, but need not necessarily (or
logically) contradict each other. These may concern particular hypotheses
or causal claims. That is, we aim to investigate the factors that explain why
disagreement within a scientific community occurs and how it is sustained.
Contributions such as those of Smith or of Nercessian are pivotal in that
they make a first step in broadening the scope of the debate on inconsisten-
cies from logic (of inconsistent theories) to the scientific practice. Such move
must be taken a step further. So the suggestion is to change, from the start,
the focus of the problem: instead of talking about inconsistencies, we talk
about disagreement, among scientists or within the scientific community.
One goal of this contribution is to explain where and why disagreement may
occur, in the course of the scientific process. We are especially interested in
cases where scientists consider evidence coming from many different types
of sources: How do scientists evaluate multifarious evidence in establishing
causal claims in such cases? How do differences in opinion about the weight
of different types of evidence give rise to disagreement over causal conclu-
sions? And how is the weighing of evidence justified? Thus, our analysis
ties to the ongoing discussion and debate concerning evidential pluralism,
specifically in the health sciences.
Consider now the current debate on evidential pluralism, which, as a
matter of fact, has been focusing on agreement. The classic discussion of
Russo and Williamson (2007) explicitly tackled the question of what evi-
dence should support a causal claim, in order to consider it as established
or confirmed. Subsequent contributions, e.g. Clarke et al. (2014), tried to
make this position more sophisticated by elaborating on the very notion of
evidence or how different sources of evidence (notably, evidence of difference-
making and of mechanisms) mutually help each other. Likewise, critical
authors such as Broadbent (2011) or Howick (2011) attacked the argument
about the need of both dimensions of the evidence, but still focused on es-
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tablishing a causal claim. Admittedly, questions about disagreement have
not been tackled specifically by either side of the debate (supporters and
critics of evidential pluralism).
Possibly, the only case study analysed in the debate about evidential
pluralism where questions about disagreement arose is the famous ‘Sem-
melweis case’ (Thagard, 1998; Gillies, 2005; Russo and Williamson, 2007;
Broadbent, 2011). Simply put, the story is that Ignaz Semmelweis, a doctor
active in nineteen-century Vienna, had hypothesised that puerperal fever
was due to some kind of infection. Even though he couldn’t support his
proposal with a mechanism compatible with medical knowledge available at
that time, he suggested washing hands appropriately after performing au-
topsies and before assisting women in labour, as a precautionary measure.
The scientific community at that time, however, precisely because a solid
theoretical framework to support Semmelweis’ hypothesis and his precau-
tionary measure was lacking, resolved to reject his ideas. By and large,
the philosophical debate centered on the question whether or not the sci-
entific community was right in rejecting Semmelweis. However, one should
arguably dig deeper and try to understand why, or what, exactly the com-
munity had divergent views on. Such questions may concern several aspects:
why does disagreement arise? But also: what should we do in such cases?
Later in section 2 we shall discuss several reasons (besides evidence) that
may hinder consensus about causal claims. In the subsequent sections, deal-
ing with the ‘cholesterol wars’, we shall also note, when appropriate, how
cases of disagreement may be resolved.
As announced earlier, within the debate on evidential pluralism, we
specifically focus on the studies on hypercholesterolemia, i.e. high levels of
cholesterol in the blood, and its role in heart disease. Hypercholesterolemia
has causes and effects that have been difficult to establish; some, to be sure,
are still under debate. Donald Gillies (2011) discusses the same episode
in the context of evidential pluralism. His main point is that, to reach
consensus, the scientific community only needed a plausible rather than a
well-confirmed mechanism. While we agree with that, we also think that
important questions remain about disagreement in this case. This episode
of medical research is therefore instructive in two ways: to get a fair theoreti-
cal understanding of ‘disagreement’ with the help of historical reconstruction
of scientific controversies, and to anticipate ways of handling disagreement
in present-day controversies. In what follows, we use ‘the cholesterol hy-
pothesis’ to refer to the somewhat imprecise package of ideas, hypotheses,
and studies about the relations between diet, serum cholesterol, and heart
disease. Simply put, according to the ‘cholesterol hypothesis’ hypercholes-
terolemia is a cause of heart disease, and, quite possibly, high blood choles-
terol level causally depends on diet.
Our reconstruction of the history of the hypothesis that hypercholes-
terolemia causes heart disease uses as main thread the question of how
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to establish a causal claim and, via the discussion of ‘loci & reasons’ of
disagreement, aims at highlighting what hindered consensus. While the
scientific community now agrees on a number of features of this medical
condition, we hope to make clear that we are in no way offering a Whiggish
reconstruction of the controversy. Also, our discussion focuses mainly on
epistemic factors. Yet, in the history of science and philosophy of science,
disagreement has often been attributed to non-rational or extra-scientific
factors. Among the most prominent non-rational factors reside incompe-
tence, ideology and venality (Mumpower and Stewart, 1996). Among the
most prominent extra-scientific factors reside moral, religious, political or
metaphysical consequences of the theory or claim in question Lugg (1978).
Our choice is not guided by questions of importance or relevance. ‘Pure’
epistemic factors are, to some extent, easier to access for us philosophers.
But we also hope that, if we get the epistemic discussion about ‘loci & rea-
sons’ right, then it will be also easier to discuss non-epistemic factors, in
future work. In particular, in this case, questions about the interference
between interests of pharmaceutical or food industries and public health
concerns should get proper attention and dedicated discussion.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present the ‘loci &
reasons’ for disagreement, namely where and why scientists may disagree.
In section 3, we offer a historical reconstruction of the ‘cholesterol wars’,
emphasising crucial points in the long search for the causes and effects of
this medical condition. In section 4, we combine the theoretical discussion
of the ‘loci & reasons’ and the historical reconstruction of the cholesterol
wars by illustrating some of the places and reasons of disagreement in the
scientific community. The discussion here is not meant to be exhaustive,
but hopefully provides a first step in how to use our theoretical framework.
Finally, in section 5, we summarise the main arguments and identify further
lines for research.
2 Scientific disagreement: loci and reasons
In this section, we develop a nuanced picture of the loci and reasons—where
and why—scientists may disagree. From the start, we abandon terms such
as ‘inconsistent’ or ‘inconsistency’ and instead couch our analysis in terms of
how, where, and to what extent scientists (dis)agree on a given hypothesis,
claim, process, or output. In sections 3 and 4, we shall focus on disagreement
that is not attributable to non-rational or extra-scientific factors, which are
typically due, amongst others, to sociological and psychological factors. For
instance, it is not uncommon that public or private authorities and meta-
physical background theories influence the positions advocated by scientists.
To analyse scientific disagreement, we distinguish two different but in-
terrelated questions:
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(i) At which stages of the scientific process do scientists disagree?
To answer this question, we reconstruct scientific process as a form
of step-wise problem-solving process.
(ii) Why do scientists disagree?
To answer this question, one may recur to epistemic, sociological,
psychological, or other factors.
We discuss these two questions in this very order. We try to keep loci and its
reasons separate. Section 2.1 discusses loci of disagreement and section 2.2
discusses reasons for disagreement and their relations to the loci. It is worth
clarifying from the start that loci and reasons for disagreement are clearly
not independent of each other, but rather interconnected. And even within
these categories, items are not independent of each other. This section
therefore runs an exercise in conceptual analysis so that the intersections
become more visible when needed, namely in the historical reconstruction
of the hypercholesterolemia case in section 3.
2.1 Loci of disagreement
To begin with, we reconstruct the scientific process in most general terms,
as finding a solution to a specific problem. This consists of the following
steps:
1. Define the problem.
2. Search for relevant data and clues to solve the problem.
3. Evaluate the data and clues.
4. Draw conclusions from the body of evidence.
This characterisation of the scientific method is admittedly very general.
It is on purpose and it has a virtue: it is widely applicable across scientific
domains, from physics to medicine. While in line with a Popperian recon-
struction of scientific method, and with subsequent hypothetico-deductive
accounts, our reconstruction does not reduce to a strict deductive approach.
Thus, ‘drawing conclusions’ is not only a matter of logical deduction, as
in a Popperian account, and can instead involve a number of inferential
practices, including, say, analogical reasoning or inference to the best expla-
nation. Furthermore, from a strict Popperian perspective, the rejection of a
given hypothesis (as formulated at the ‘problem definition’ stage) would lead
to an outright rejection of the whole theory. Instead, according to the char-
acterisation above, this does not automatically happen. As we shall explain
further in this section and later in the discussion of hypercholesterolemia,
disagreement may happen at various stages of the scientific process and for
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various reasons. Also, the rejection of one hypothesis (or piece of evidence)
does not lead to the outright rejection of all available knowledge about the
phenomenon under scrutiny.
We thus take a broad characterisation of the scientific process as a use-
ful starting point to develop on the issue of (dis)agreement; specifically, in
section 4 we bestow attention to how disagreement concerned issues related
to evidence or to disease mechanisms. In so doing, we already depart from
the standard set up of the debate on inconsistencies: our interest is not in
presumed or actual logical incompatibilities of theories, but rather in critical
places of the scientific process, where disagreement is likely to occur.
Our reconstruction of the scientific process is closely related to that
of psychologist and policy analyst Thomas Stewart (1991) but also differs
in some important respects. Stewart proposes the following hierarchy for
scientific judgment regarding global warming:
• Level 1: raw data and facts (where, according to him, no disagreement
happens yet).
• Level 2: studies and results are grouped.
• Level 3: interpretation and aggregation of particular lines of research.
• Level 4: drawing broad conclusions based on lower level conclusions.
• Level 5: policy recommendation based on Level 4 conclusions are
reached.
The first four levels of the hierarchy presuppose a clear problem definition
and raw data and facts that are not subject to disagreement. However,
as we shall see in section 3 and 4, this did not happen in the cholesterol
controversy. In order to account for some of the substantial disagreement in
the cholesterol controversy, we cannot assume that problem definitions and
Level 1 are free from disagreement. Instead, our contribution is to show that
loci and reasons need to be made explicit, as important disagreement may
arise at those stages too. Below, we discuss the main loci where disagreement
is likely to occur and preview some loci of historical disagreement in the
cholesterol cases. The controversies on the ‘cholesterol hypothesis’ help us
illustrating this point. This lends further support to our general strategy
to move away from the narrow focus on inconsistent theories and instead
broaden the perspective by taking the whole scientific process, and all the
stakeholders involved, into account.
Philosopher Andrew Lugg (1978), discusses the issue of scientific dis-
agreement. In this paper, Lugg presents a ‘classical view’ of disagreement,
according to which rational researchers disagree only if they differ with re-
spect to the data they posses, i.e., only if they disagree with respect to the
locus of search for relevant data and clues to solve the problem. He then goes
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on to reject the classical view by considering three historical cases for which
he argues that 1) the same data was available to the researchers, 2) different
disciplinary backgrounds were the key reason for major disagreement and
3) disagreement rooted in different disciplinary backgrounds was rational
in these cases. Our aim, at this stage, is largely descriptive, rather than
normative. This means that we do not discuss whether this classical view is
correct, i.e., whether it is rational or irrational to disagree, especially with
respect to the third and fourth step of problem solving. In other words, we
do not take issue with the question whether, given a certain problem and a
certain body of data and clues, there is only one rational way to evaluate the
data and clues and answer the problem. We now proceed to the discussion
of steps 1-4 of the scientific process, as potential loci for disagreement.
Problem definition. In the first step, different epistemic agents may con-
sider different problems, because they use relevant concepts differently or
they consider different questions altogether (Mumpower and Stewart, 1996).
Consider, for instance, the question whether high cholesterol causes heart
diseases. Depending on how the concept of cause is understood, the same re-
search question may point to different problems. We will see below in section
3 that part of the historical disagreement about the cholesterol hypothesis
was due to different meaning and use of the word ‘cause’.
Search for relevant data and clues to solve the problem. In the sec-
ond step, scientists may have access to different data and clues. This may
be due to different reasons. One reason is that a group of researchers may
not be aware of the existence or may not be able to understand some data
or clues which are relevant to the problem. For instance, it might be that
due to their disciplinary focus and training, epidemiologists are less inclined
to attend to bio-chemical data about the mechanism connecting cholesterol
to heart disease than cardiologists are. A second reason is that, a group
of researchers may have different methodological standards as to how we
can create evidence relevant to the problem or which evidence the consider
to be relevant to the problem Mumpower and Stewart (1996). Are, for in-
stance, quasi-experimental, observational methods, animal studies, mecha-
nistic studies or qualitative methods suitable to create data or clues relevant
to causal questions? We will see below in section 3, that some researchers
did not accept the cholesterol hypothesis, because, although plenty of data
from observational evidence was available at their time of evaluation, no
trial evidence was available.
Evaluate the data and clues. In the third step, methodological ques-
tions about quality of evidence become pertinent. If clues and data are con-
sidered to be relevant to the problem, the question remains whether they
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are of good or bad quality. When evaluating the data, scientists may as-
sign, for instance, higher quality to data obtained by trials than to evidence
from biological mechanisms or observational studies. Apart from assigning
different qualities to different types of evidence, researchers may disagree
whether a certain piece of evidence is of high quality or low quality. While
in the cholesterol case some researchers judged the important Lipid Research
Clinics Coronary Primary Prevention Trial to be of high quality, opponents
of the the cholesterol hypothesis pointed to its possible flaws – see also later
section 3.
Draw conclusions from the body of evidence. The fourth step of
problem solving concerns evidence amalgamation, i.e., the question how ev-
idence from different sources should be combined to solve the problem. This
problem is hard-wired. For instance, currently the most widely used pro-
posal for evidence amalgamation proposed by the GRADE-working group
and the methods employed by the International Agency for Research on
Cancer (IARC) still differ with respect to their use of observational data
and data from mechanistic studies to solve problems. Daniel Steinberg, a
pioneering investigator in the field of lipid metabolism and atherosclerosis,
argues that, in the cholesterol case, all available evidence should be con-
sidered (Steinberg, 2007, p.1-3). Data from animal studies, observational
studies, mechanistic studies and trials has been available since long time.
However, as we will see in section 3, there was disagreement as how to
combine these different sources of evidence. It is important to note that dis-
agreement about amalgamation of the evidence need not necessarily concern
the whole body of evidence and different types of evidence. For instance,
some researchers claimed that results from early trials were mixed, while
others claimed that the same trials convincingly lend support to the choles-
terol hypothesis – for a fuller discussion, see also section 4.
At each of these steps, reasons for disagreement are multiple. As anticipated
in the introduction, some reasons for disagreement are due to epistemic fac-
tors, others to socio-political factors (including vested interests of individuals
or of lobbies), or psychological factors. In sections 3 and 4 we mainly fo-
cus on epistemic factors, which include different training of the scientists,
different methodological views, different conceptualisations of cause, mech-
anism, or other. We now proceed to analyse in detail possible reasons for
disagreement and the steps of the problem-solving process that they most
affect.
2.2 Reasons for disagreement
We borrow an initial list of reasons for disagreement from the works of Lugg









Lugg groups these reasons into non-rational (sociological, fact-value con-
fusion, psychological and individual incompetence), extra-scientific, and ra-
tional (certain disciplinary differences and epistemic). In what follows we
do not make any normative claim about which of the reasons is a rational
reason for disagreement and which not. We use this list of reasons in the
discussion of the controversy on the ‘cholesterol hypothesis’ that will follow
in section 4, focusing specifically on epistemic, disciplinary differences, and
fact-value confusion.
Sociological (and political) reasons for disagreement are reasons that are
attributable to the socio-political structure and dynamic of the scientific
environment or the broader community the researchers are part of. For
instance, authorities may dominate the field of the researcher in question
or economic interests of the food industry may interfere with dietary rec-
ommendations. Psychological reasons concern researchers individual minds.
Individuals may disagree because they think differently about the problem,
without being incompetent, self-interested or advocating personal values
(Mumpower and Stewart, 1996). Specifically, researchers may have differ-
ent modes of cognition, i.e., they may be creatively or analytically orientated
minds or more or less subject to general biases in human reasoning like con-
firmation bias (Mumpower and Stewart, 1996)1. While researchers are held
to be less responsible for their mode of cognition or their susceptibility to
confirmation bias, individual incompetence may range from logical fallacies
to misreading and misinterpreting different clues. There may be, of course,
other kinds of social or psychological constraints at stake.
Lugg (1978) identifies the following extra-scientific reasons: different
metaphysical, religious, moral or political background theories. Lugg con-
siders, for instance, different training and different background assumptions
and theories within different disciplines as most important source for dis-
agreement. Researchers from different disciplines often have “different ac-
cess to the system of scientific belief and practice as a whole” (Lugg, 1978,
1Mumpower and Stuart speak of different organising principles rather than psycholog-
ical differences.
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p.282). To argue for the claim that different disciplinary background is a
key reason for disagreement he considers three examples. In particular, Lugg
considers landscape modelling. As discussed by Lugg, Agassiz’s view that
the glacial action extensively modelled the landscape (for Agassiz’s view see
Rudwick (1969)) has been rejected by Lyell in favour of his iceberg theory
(for more information about the relevant views see Davies (1969)). Lugg
argues that this disagreement is due to the fact that Agassiz was an ex-
pert in paleoichthyology and Lyell in topography (Lugg, 1978). Different
training of researchers may lead to disagreement at all four steps of problem
solving. As we will see below in sections 3 and 4, cardiologists and epidemi-
ologists, for instance, are interested in different questions, they employ a
different concept of cause, they refer to different studies and evaluate them
differently.
Fact-value confusions occur if researchers mix up what should be the
case and what is the case. A classical example is a conflict of interests.
Researchers may benefit from the acceptance of a claim by, for instance,
their peers or a wider public. This may consciously influence the researchers
judgment (for instance, in case of funding by a third party) or unconsciously
cloud the judgment of the researcher (for instance, in case of the reluctance
to admit misjudgment). Often, fact-value confusions may lead different re-
searchers to ask different question; also, the extent to which problem solving
is influenced by fact-value confusions remains highly controversial, argues
Mumpower and Stewart (1996). For instance, in the cholesterol controversy,
researchers are often concerned with side-effects of cholesterol reduction.
While this is a natural concern for whether reducing cholesterol is good
or bad for a certain given population (a value-question), it is irrelevant as
to whether cholesterol causes heart disease (a fact-question). For instance,
substantial disagreement on whether high cholesterol increases mortality by
other causes than heart disease remained until the first statin trials (see
section 3). Whether high cholesterol increases mortality by other causes
that are unrelated to heart disease is clearly irrelevant as to whether heart
disease is caused by high cholesterol.
For the sake of the argument, we assume that if two researchers, belong-
ing to the same discipline, share the relevant socio-political environment
and psychological features, are not subject to fact-value confusion or incom-
petence and no extra-scientific factors are pertinent disagree, they disagree
for purely epistemic reasons. But our argument is not to show that such
(genuine) epistemic disagreement is possible. It is likely that epistemic dis-
agreement is ultimately explainable in terms of non-epistemic reasons. But
we pragmatically classify disagreement as epistemic, if there is no reason to
assume that one of the other reasons can account for the disagreement. In
this way, we aim to show that even remaining at the epistemic level, a proper
account of disagreement must take into account the whole scientific process,
rather than just focusing on the final product – the theory – as typical of the
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literature on inconsistencies in science. This should lend further support to
our initial choice of shifting the focus from inconsistency to disagreement.
3 The ‘cholesterol wars’
Contemporary biomedical science spends considerable effort on studying the
causes and effective treatments of heart disease. Today, a consensus view
states that heart disease can be effectively treated or prevented altogether
by controlling blood cholesterol levels, especially cholesterol carried in low
density lipoproteins (LDL), for example by statin therapy. However, histor-
ically, the question of what causes heart disease has neither been obvious
nor unambiguous. Until the early decades of the 20th century, the prevailing
view stated that the thickening of arteries and the resulting symptoms of
heart disease are an inevitable consequence of the loss of elasticity of blood
vessels that occurs throughout the vascular system as one ages. In other
words, ‘heart disease’ was not a disease category per se, in the sense of a
pathological phenomenon whose specific aetiology needs to be uncovered in
order to treat and prevent it; it was instead an irreversible side-effect of
old age. First attempts at reconceptualising heart disease as a preventable,
disease-like phenomenon were motivated by animal experiments suggesting
that dietary factors can greatly accelerate the development of arterial lesions
that are the likely cause of symptoms like infarction and stroke. We describe
these and further developments below.
3.1 Evidence for the ‘cholesterol hypothesis’: the early 20th
century
The earliest evidence for a causal link between cholesterol and heart disease
came from animal experiments performed by Russian pathologist Nikolai
Anitschkow. Anitschkow conducted a series of experiments in which rabbits
were kept on a high cholesterol diet after which he studied their arteries in
autopsy for changes in the structure of the vessel wall (Anitschkow, 1913).
The experiments showed that cholesterol-fed rabbits had developed lesions in
the arteries reminiscent of human atherosclerosis – a common cause of heart
disease. Studying the composition of the lesions, Anitshckow discovered
deposits of free cholesterol, as well as accumulation of macrophages laden
with cholesterol and other lipids, leading him to conclude that cholesterol
probably causes the lesion development. However, a detailed explanation of
the mode of cholesterol deposition or the role of the macrophage activity
was beyond the medical understanding of the time.
Anitschkow’s results flew in the face of the received view among his
contemporaries, according to which the thickening and hardening of ar-
teries that characterizes atherosclerosis is due to the loss of elasticity of
blood vessels and various ‘wear and tear’ that inevitably occurs as one
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ages. The prevailing ‘senescence hypothesis’ was founded on population-
wide statistics and clinical observation: incidence of heart disease and the
loss of elasticity of blood vessels was robustly correlated with age. Unsur-
prisingly, Anitshckow’s experiments attracted a fair amount of criticism.
It was argued that rabbit – a herbivore whose natural diet is cholesterol-
free – is hardly a valid model for studying the effects of cholesterol in hu-
mans, and that the experimental intervention was so unrealistically severe
that little could be said about cholesterol’s effects in the range that would
mirror average human diet (Ophuls, 1933; Weiss and Minot, 1933). Fur-
ther animal experiments were subsequently conducted by many scientists
on different model species, partly addressing these worries (Aschoff, 1933;
Bruger and Oppenheim, 1951). These showed mixed results, but many ac-
corded with Anitschkow’s original experiments. However, due to the lack
of understanding of cholesterol metabolism and the mechanism of choles-
terol transport in the blood, the animal data was open to many skeptical
interpretations (Duff and McMillan, 1951; Peters and Van Slyke, 1946).
While caution concerning an extrapolation from the animal models was
justified, the successful experiments could be further validated by compar-
ison to findings about heart disease in humans with familial hypercholes-
terolemia. Familial hypercholesterolemia is a near-perfectly heritable condi-
tion involving extremely high innate blood cholesterol level and xanthomas,
i.e. visible accumulation of cholesterol and other lipids under the skin. Fa-
milial hypercholesterolemia is often accompanied with atherosclerotic heart
disease at a very young age. This was known, and was clearly consistent
with the idea that heart disease has at least something to do with choles-
terol metabolism (Muller, 1939). Plenty of room for disagreement nonethe-
less remained: with no mechanism identified, the association between the
xanthomas, blood cholesterol and heart disease was open to many causal
interpretations, and one would perhaps not pick as first choice an inter-
pretation that contradicted the received view. In addition, the validity of
these findings was unclear, also considering the role of cholesterol in non-
hypercholesterolemic people (Steinberg, 2007, p. 31). These findings – the
observational data of hypercholesterolemia patients and the animal experi-
ments – were the most important early evidence that founded the cholesterol
hypothesis as a contender to the prevailing senescence hypothesis, even if
the hypothesis initially had but few proponents. In section 4, we relate some
aspects of the early history of the cholesterol hypothesis to the taxonomy of
scientific disagreement introduced in section 2.
3.2 In search of mechanisms and the first trials
In the early part of the 20th century, virtually nothing was known about the
mechanism of cholesterol transport in the blood. This would not directly
undermine the hypothesis founded in Anitschkow’s work, but it rendered
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further research on the cholesterol-heart disease link somewhat speculative.
This, along with the well-entrenched view that arterial thickening is due to
ageing, might explain why the cholesterol hypothesis was not investigated
in a clinical setting until much later. The opportunity costs of setting up
large clinical studies are high, so some initial credence is required of any
hypothesis that deserves to be tested in a clinical trial.
Insights into the cholesterol transport mechanism came with the discov-
ery of the low-density lipoproteins by biologist John Gofman and his col-
laborators, who subsequently described a taxonomy of plasma lipoproteins
according to their density (Gofman et al., 1949). Gofman was already con-
vinced that cholesterol plays a causal role in atherogenesis, and proceeded
to correlate different lipoproteins with heart disease outcomes, the main
finding being that heart disease risk is elevated in patients in which choles-
terol is predominantly carried in mid- to low-density lipoproteins. Once
these findings became available, the cholesterol hypothesis gained the initial
theoretical credibility to justify larger scale clinical research.
Clinical trials testing the hypothesis in humans were not conducted until
some forty years after Anitschkow’s initial studies, but the time between
the 1950’s and 1970’s saw several trials testing the ideas that reduction of
dietary fat intake or switching unsaturated for saturated fats would reduce
the incidence of heart disease (see Connor and Connor (2002)). We will
restrict our discussion to a basic outline. A complete survey of all these
studies should be the object of a separate historical investigation.
These trials mostly sampled either populations of hospital patients, or
individuals who had survived previous cardiac events (and who presumably
thus were motivated to comply with the dietary intervention); individuals in
the trials were administered a low fat diet or diet rich in unsaturated fats.
Blood cholesterol, clinical cardiac events and/or mortality were typically
measured as the outcome. The patients in the intervention group either
served as their own control group, or in some cases of inpatient trials, were
compared to a control group who were given regular hospital diet. The
results from these trials were mixed: many of the studies showed results
right above the threshold of statistical significance. This, at face value,
somewhat undermined the prospects of the cholesterol hypothesis as a basis
of clinical decisions or public health policy.
While the evidence from diet intervention trials was mixed, there were
some large scale epidemiological studies conducted roughly at the same pe-
riod, that seemed to corroborate the cholesterol hypothesis. One of the
most important of these was the ‘Seven Countries Study’ lead by Ancel
Keys (1966). This study compared populations from seven countries with
markedly different dietary traditions with respect to saturated fat intake,
and calculated the correlation between dietary fat and incidence of heart
disease. The study showed that heart disease mortality was roughly propor-
tional to average blood cholesterol levels as well as saturated fat intake, a
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fact that was clearly explainable by the cholesterol hypothesis. However, due
to its observational nature, it was difficult to rule out, beyond any doubt,
the possibility of confounding causal factors. Keys at al.’s study measured
several other dietary, health, and lifestyle factors, but as the theoretical un-
derstanding of the disease process was far from complete at the time, it was
difficult to tell which confounders one would have to be able to control in
order to gain strong evidence of causation. The most obvious confounder
– genetic background – nonetheless could be later ruled out by pooling
the original Keys study together with evidence gleaned from populations
that share the same genetic background but differ with respect to dietary
habits. One example of such a design was a study by Robertson et al., which
compared the incidence of heart disease in native Japanese populations and
migrant Japanese population residing in California (Robertson et al., 1977).
Aside from the work by Keys’ group, perhaps the other most important epi-
demiological study was the Framingham Heart Study, a longitudinal study
conducted by the National Heart Institute in Framingham, Massachusetts
(Kannel et al., 1961). In the first cohort the study included more than five
thousands subjects from Framingham, who were measured for several po-
tential risk factors, one of them being cholesterol, and followed these with
periodic examinations for more than twenty years. The results that emerged
showed a clear association with baseline cholesterol levels and subsequent
myocardial infarction.
At this point it is important to distinguish two separate questions about
cholesterol’s role in aetiology of heart disease:
1. Does serum cholesterol cause the damage to the arteries?
This question concerns the causal power of cholesterol to induce
– one way or another – the lesions seen in experimental animal and
human atherosclerosis.
2. Does serum cholesterol level (strongly) depend on dietary fat intake?
This question concerns the influence of diet on blood cholesterol
levels.
Before the development of effective cholesterol-lowering drugs, researchers
were limited to dietary interventions for lowering blood cholesterol, and thus
any hope of answering question 1 with clinical trials depended on a posi-
tive answer to question 2. This is a fairly simple point, but ignoring it can
create confusion. Even if studies employing dietary interventions failed to
show reduction in symptoms or mortality from heart disease, this would not
necessarily mean that the cholesterol hypothesis is false, if it is taken as
an answer to the first question. Also, even if one considers the problem to
concern question 2, short lasting follow up trials may not be able to provide
unequivocal answers, as it was somewhat unclear how long one must adhere
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to a low fat diet in order for it to show beneficial effects. During the time
when the mechanism of cholesterol-induced heart disease was yet largely
unknown, it was easy to lump these questions together, and thus equivocate
between between two problem definitions that each ask for an answer to just
one of the questions. This could lead to situations where evidence pertinent
to just one of the problems was brought in to evaluate the other, or both
problems. As a result of this, incompatible opinions concerning whether high
cholesterol causes heart disease that are not content-related may result. As
we have explained in section 2, tacit differences in the problem definition
may sustain scientific disagreement.
Despite considerable uncertainty about the status of the cholesterol hy-
pothesis, the American Heart Association (AHA) cautiously acknowledged
it in 1961, stating that elevated blood cholesterol should be considered a
clinically relevant factor. This conclusion was based on the animal data and
the results from epidemiological studies. However, AHA did not consider it
to be conclusively shown that heart disease is preventable by dietary mea-
sures. Page et al. (1961, p.133) concerning a diet with poly-unsaturated fats
state:
This recommendations is based on the best scientific information
available at the present time. More complete information must
be obtained before final conclusions can be reached.
In 1971, the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute launched an in-
terventional study titled The Lipid Research Clinics Coronary Prevention
Trial (LRC-CPPT) – named after the participating centers – in which hy-
percholesterolemic men were treated with a cholesterol-lowering agent and
followed for more than 7 years. The compound used in the intervention con-
dition was cholestyramine, which hastens the removal of cholesterol in bile
acid. It was hypothesized that this would lead to overall reduction in serum
cholesterol, thus providing a way to bypass the diet-blood link and test the
causal effect of serum cholesterol as such. The results showed a reduction
of circa 20 per cent in the primary outcome of death, or nonfatal myocar-
dial infarction (Rifkind, 1984). This could be considered a more definitive
demonstration, but the total evidence still provided mixed signals, as each
source of evidence had its characteristic limitations, and individual studies
provided somewhat inconsistent results. These are summarized in table 1.
As evidence from any particular source could be contested by pointing to
their characteristic limitations, the disagreement would persist.
A prominent cardiologist, John McMichael, expressed a highly skeptical
take on the evidence in the British Medical Journal at the end of the 1970’s:
The best-conducted dietary trials under the auspices of the MRC’s
statistical control have given convincingly negative results. In
survivors who have had coronary manifestations, and are thus
16
Table 1: Multiple sources of evidence
Source of evidence Limitations
Animal models Questionable validity
Observational studies Confounding by factors unrelated to lipid in-
take/cholesterol
Clinical trials Direct interventions on blood cholesterol not fea-
sible; non-significant effects
at special risk, low-fat and soy-bean oil diets, which can lower
the blood cholesterol concentration, have been entirely ineffec-
tive in slowing the progress of the disease towards recurrences
or death. Drugs that reduce the blood cholesterol concentration
also failed to influence outcome when tried on large numbers of
similarly affected patients whose disorder was liable to deterio-
rate (McMichael, 1979, p. 173)
To back up his case, McMichael cites several trials conducted by The
Coronary Drug Project, sponsored by the National Heart, Lung and Blood
institute. These trials tested the effects of interventions with estrogen,
niacin, clofibrate, and dextrothyroxine sodium on total mortality and cause
specific coronary heart disease (CHD) mortality. Of these studies, only the
niacine and clofibrate trials were carried out as planned. Neither showed sta-
tistically significant effects with respect to the designated endpoints (The Coronary Drug Project,
1975). It should be noted that at the time of publication of McMichael’s
critique, a similar trial with cholestyramine – mentioned above – was under-
way, and would in time produce much more promising results. It is unclear
whether data from the cholestyramine trial was publically available yet at
that time, and thus we must withhold judgement on whether McMichael
deliberately chose to ignore those data or not. What is clear however, is
that McMichael was well aware of the epidemiological evidence correlating
cholesterol, saturated fats and CHD. In other publications, he went on to
claim that the endorsement of the cholesterol hypothesis by various public
health bodies was largely due to misattribution of evidential weight to epi-
demiological data in the absence of corroborating theoretical explanation or
definite demonstration of causation in a controlled trial (McMichael, 1979,
p. 174). McMichael’s stance towards the whole body of evidence could be re-
constructed as one where statistical evidence from epidemiology could not on
its own support conclusions about policy. Instead, according to McMichael,
statistical evidence ought to be interpreted in light of other evidence – a
process that McMichael somewhat vaguely calls ‘scientific analysis’ – before
any firm conclusions about causation can be drawn. This scientific anal-
ysis, according to McMichael, had been neglected by those who accepted
the cholesterol hypothesis on the basis of (mostly) just the epidemiological
17
evidence (McMichael, 1979, p. 174).
We take McMichael’s reasoning to exemplify one possible model for eval-
uating evidence of causality, in which a relatively high degree of coherence of
observational evidence, trial evidence and theoretical understanding of the
underlying mechanisms is required before one is allowed to infer a causal
claim. This is perhaps also characteristic of his disciplinary background of
cardiology, where a pressing concern is to understand the details of the pro-
cesses that lead to disease outcomes in the individual. For epidemiologists
or public health experts – traditionally much more preoccupied with identi-
fying risk factors based on population-wide studies – such requirements were
less salient, which could explain a coarse distinction between the support-
ers of the cholesterol hypothesis in the epidemiology community on the one
hand, and a group of staunch critics within cardiology on the other hand.
McMichael followed this attack to the evidence base of the cholesterol hy-
pothesis by questioning the safety of the recommended cholesterol-lowering
diets (McMichael, 1979, p. 174). This was not an appeal to an alleged epis-
temic shortcoming of the cholesterol hypothesis, and thus gives the impres-
sion that McMichael was asking for extra-scientific values to bear on a sci-
entific question, amounting to the kind of fact-value confusion we described
in section 2. However, such arguments are not uncommon in medicine, nor
should they be, as medical science aims not only at understanding disease
phenomena, but also at using that understanding to reduce the burden of
disease. Thus, one can find in the literature two types of arguments against
the cholesterol hypothesis, often not kept apart: one contests the truth of
the hypothesis that hypercholesterolemia causes heart disease, and the other
contests the clinical implication of this hypothesis – the normative claim that
one should intervene to lower blood cholesterol. Conflating these two ques-
tions is apt to lead to confusion over what problem, exactly, the debatants
disagree on: on the status of the causal claim, or on what follows from the
claim in terms of implications for good clinical practice.
3.3 The bio-chemical basis of the cholesterol hypothesis
The next breakthroughs came from mechanistic studies in biology. In 1972,
Joseph Goldstein and Michael Brown discovered the LDL receptor (Goldstein and Brown,
2009). The LDL receptor is a cell-surface receptor that allows cells to ex-
tract cholesterol from LDL, to be used for cell wall synthesis. Based on what
was known of cholesterol biosynthesis, Goldstein and Brown had assumed,
and then demonstrated, that endogenous cholesterol synthesis in humans is
feedback-regulated. That is, there is a mechanism by which excess choles-
terol is extracted from the bloodstream, and endogenous cholesterol synthe-
sis adjusted with respect to the amount of cholesterol that is so extracted.
Identifying the LDL receptor as a component that allows cells to scavenge
cholesterol from blood presented Goldstein and Brown with an explanation
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for the heritability of familial hypercholesterolemia: a mutated LDL receptor
gene would leave the liver cells of its carrier without the capacity to extract
cholesterol from blood, and endogenous cholesterol biosynthesis would thus
be unable to adjust to exogenous cholesterol intake, leading to a continuous
increase in overall blood choelsterol. This would also confirm the direction
of causation in the epidemiological studies on familial hypercholesterolemia
– the subcutaneous cholesterol accumulation must be caused by excess blood
cholesterol, not the other way around.
The early 1970’s brought another pivotal discovery in atherosclerosis
research, one that curiously did not directly connect with the cholesterol
hypothesis. This was the discovery of the platelet-derived growth factor,
which suggested a mechanism for the development of the mature atheroscle-
rotic lesion that is characterized by abnormal smooth muscle cell prolif-
eration. Russell Ross and John Glomset hypothesized that the formation
of atherosclerotic lesions begins with an injury to the cell wall. Platelets
recruited to heal the injury subsequently release signaling molecules, such
as the platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF), which induces smooth mus-
cle cell proliferation and thus the growth of the lesion (Ross and Glomset,
1976a,b). Ross and Glomset’s hypothesis is based on a general mechanism
of cell signalling known to control growth and cell differentiation. Ross and
Glomset’s innovation was to apply this mechanism schema to the question
of smooth muscle cell proliferation. This hypothesis was then backed up
(among other evidence) by the discovery of the crucial entity PDGF whose
characteristic activities can explain the growth of the atherosclerotic lesion in
particular. Ross and Glomset hardly mention lipoproteins in their research,
merely pointing that sustained high levels of serum lipoproteins might be
among many other factors that dispose to the initial damage.
Ross and Glomset’s hypothesis became very influential among cardiol-
ogists, who were traditionally more skeptical of the cholesterol hypothesis.
It is instructive to pause for a moment to consider this, and compare the
situation in epidemiology, in which the cholesterol hypothesis gained the
support of authority figures like Ancel Keys from much earlier on. Car-
diology’s job description is to study the causes of specific clinical cardiac
events such as infarction and stroke, and thus its focus in atherosclerosis re-
search has been on the properties of the advanced lesion which are directly
responsible for the timing and severity of such events. Important research
questions here concern the process of smooth muscle cell proliferation and
the deposition of connective tissue to form the lesion that leads to clogging
of the artery, and the propensity of rupturing of the fibrous cap that covers
it. Ross and Glomset brought an existing mechanism template from cell
biology – cell-to-cell communication via signaling molecules – and applied
it to the case of the developing lesion in a way that immediately suggested
an explanation for the clinical events cardiologists were interested in. Even
though lipoproteins were acknowledged as one possible factor among many
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that might initiate the injury, in Ross and Glomset’s hypothesis these factors
were conceptualized as background conditions that enable the mechanism
of lesion development to operate, not as salient causes of the clinical events.
Compared to cardiologists, epidemiologists were on average more likely to
accept the cholesterol hypothesis. Epidemiologists consider as their task the
mapping of health outcomes to risk factors, and the primary research heuris-
tic is to look for statistical dependencies that predict incidence of disease,
or to devise mathematical models of the spread of a disease at the level of
whole populations. Epidemiologists’ research efforts are not primarily orga-
nized around elaborating mechanisms and applying established mechanism
schemas to new phenomena, and the research is thus not directed by the
availability of applicable mechanism schemas.
From these considerations, one can put together possible explanations
for the difference in opinion between the two fields when it comes to ac-
ceptance of the cholesterol hypothesis. Cardiologists were, qua disciplinary
framework, more focused on proximate causes of heart disease, and required
the articulation of a mechanism before an explanation could be accepted.
The proximate cause of symptoms of heart disease is the fibrous cap that
forms on top of the initial fatty streak lesion. Cardiologists’ main interest
was in the properties and development of the latter, which is the proxi-
mal cause of symptoms of heart disease. By conceptualizing atherosclerosis
as a phenomenon crucially involving cell-signaling, Ross and Glomset were
able to explain many properties of the mature lesion, as well as its devel-
opment, in terms of mechanisms that were already widely accepted, and
which involved no essential appeal to the role of cholesterol. By contrast,
epidemiologists were focused on tracking more distal factors which make a
difference to the distribution of CHD in different populations, and could
plausibly accept cholesterol as such a factor even in the absence of detailed
mechanistic understanding. One could thus see the difference in opinion
between the two groups as a difference in problem definition, and difference
in focus on proximal versus distal causes. Later in section 4 we shall discuss
these differences in more detail.
Further mechanistic studies provided evidence of ways by which choles-
terol carried in low density lipoproteins (LDLs) could induce the formation
of lesions in the artery wall. One major line of research focused on the
‘oxidative modification hypothesis of atherogenesis’. The oxidative modifi-
cation hypothesis suggested that while cholesterol itself is chemically inert
in a way that could not cause the initial damage to arteries, oxidized forms
of LDL would be able to penetrate the vessel wall and start the process of
development of the complex lesion. Studies dating in the late 1970s, and
form there on, demonstrated that LDL gets oxidized in vivo in model or-
ganisms, and that oxidized LDL both capable of damaging endothelial cells
and being taken up by macrophages in vitro (Chisolm and Steinberg, 2000).
These studies could further bridge the gap between already known mecha-
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nisms of atherogenesis and the large-scale epidemiological results. If excess
cholesterol in itself could set in motion the mechanisms of lesion formation,
this would give a straightforward explanation of the epidemiological data
in terms of a concrete causal process. But as with all laboratory research,
the validity of the in vitro results with respect to whole-organism physiol-
ogy, and that of the animal models with respect to humans, was somewhat
uncertain.
3.4 Contemporary consensus and the statin era
By the early 1980s, the cholesterol hypothesis could be supported by mul-
timodal evidence from laboratory studies, some human experiments, and
epidemiological studies. While the hypothesis was not understood as being
conclusively demonstrated, public health authorities clearly acknowledged
the literature supporting it. In 1982, the Nutrition Committee of the Amer-
ican Heart Association (AHA) issued a statement on AHA’s current stance
concerning the relationship between diet and heart disease (Grundy et al.,
1982). This statement lists elevated blood cholesterol, high blood pressure,
diabetes, and obesity as the main CHD risk factors, notes the special role
of LDL in atherosclerosis, as well as the effects of saturated fat intake on
blood (Grundy et al., 1982, p. 16-17).
The road to large clinical trials capable of compelling a consensus on
the cholesterol hypothesis required the development of effective drugs for
lowering serum cholesterol levels, i.e. the discovery and clinical develop-
ment of statins. Statins are a class of drugs that inhibit endogenous choles-
terol biosynthesis by competitively binding HMG-CoA (3-hydroxy-3-methyl-
glutaryl-coenzyme A). HMG-CoA is a precursor of mevalonic acid, which
again is a precursor of cholesterol in the cholesterol biosynthesis pathway.
Normally, the conversion of HMG-CoA into mevalonic acid is catalyzed by
another enzyme, HMG-CoA reductase (HMGCR). Statins mimic the struc-
ture of HMGCR, but do not have the same enzymatic activity. Adminis-
tering statins reduces the rate of cholesterol production, as HMGCR is a
rate-limiting enzyme in the pathway.
The first statin, nowadays known as compactin, was initially discovered
by biochemist Akira Endo while working at the Sankyo Research Labora-
tories in 1972 (Endo, 2010). Its development for clinical use was some-
what delayed, possibly due to unpromising results in preclinical animal
testing (Endo, 2010, pp. 487-488). Once the compound was tested in hu-
man trials, the results looked immediately promising (Mabuchi et al., 1981;
Yamamoto et al., 1980). These early studies were small, but positive enough
to warrant more extensive studies. Possibly, the most important single study
compelling a consensus on the cholesterol hypothesis was the Scandinavian
Simvastatin Survival Study (4s) (Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study Group,
1994). This was a randomized trial with simvastatin – one of the later statin
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drugs – involving 4444 participants who were followed up for an average of
5.4 years. The study was a success, its major advantage being that it could
demonstrate not just a reduction in mortality from heart disease or any
proxy endpoints, but a reduction in overall mortality. This helped clear
worries about the safety of cholesterol reducing interventions. Since then,
numerous trials have provided concordant results, persuading a majority of
the medical community to accept the causal role of hypercholesterolemia in
heart disease (Collaborators, 2005).
The statin studies cemented the opinion that aggressive reduction of
serum cholesterol reduces the incidence of heart disease due to coronary
narrowing in many at-risk groups. As of today, no major disagreement ex-
ists within mainstream medicine considering such a causal claim. Residual
controversies about the efficacy of dietary regulation, however, have contin-
ued over the statin era. Nonetheless, the recent opinion of major regulatory
and public health authorities generally favors a view according to which
reduction of dietary cholesterol is effective as well. In 1990, an AHA scien-
tific statement states that the evidence for a causal link from either dietary
or serum cholesterol to CHD is overwhelming, and justifies national pro-
grams for cholesterol control (LaRosa et al., 1990). The most recent AHA
dietary recommendations still advice limiting saturated fats and trans fats
(Eckel et al., 2013). However, trial evidence suggests that the beneficial
effect of dietary cholesterol regulation is quite modest (Hooper et al., 2001).
4 Loci & reasons for disagreement in the choles-
terol wars
The cholesterol wars did not come to an end, but some armistice hap-
pened. Slowly, the scientific community reached some consensus about
aetiology, preventive measures, and interventions. Consensus, however, is
not an unassailable fortress. Periodically, competing hypotheses get dusted
off (e.g. ‘sugar conspiracy’, as also recently reported in The Guardian2) to
question the very basis of this consensus. Therefore, it is useful to linger
a bit more on these controversies and to refer back to the loci and reasons
of disagreement. In this section, we consider more explicitly where certain
institutions or researchers in the past have disagreed about the link be-
tween cholesterol and heart disease. Specifically, we show that substantial
disagreement occurred at all loci of disagreement.
Looking retrospectively at the cholesterol wars, it seems to us that by
1994 the causal link between cholesterol and heart disease had been estab-
lished with reasonable confidence – our stance here relies especially on the
2See for instance: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/apr/07/the-sugar-conspiracy-robert-lustig-john-
accessed on 27 November 2016.
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work of (Steinberg, 2007). However, we do not mean to imply that cer-
tain institutions or researchers were plainly wrong in doubting the causal
link. On basis of the available and incomplete evidence, there was room for
rational disagreement.
4.1 Different problem definitions
As section 3 has shown, the so-called ‘cholesterol hypothesis’ does not refer
to a single, specified research question. Our reconstruction revealed instead
the existence of rather different questions, for instance:
1. Is high cholesterol a cause of heart disease? (A causal question)
2. Will lowering cholesterol lower heart disease mortality? To what ex-
tent? (An interventional question)
3. Will lowering cholesterol lower overall mortality? (A safety question)
4. In which group of people will lowering cholesterol lower heart disease
mortality? (An extrapolation question)
5. Does diet lower cholesterol? (A different causal question)
The first four questions are ordered according to the amount of evi-
dence needed to answer them. Increasingly more evidence is needed to
answer questions further down the enumeration. Many researchers consid-
ered answering the causal question to be the easiest task (see, for instance,
Page et al. (1961) and US Department of Health and Human Services and others
(1984)). According to the NHI consensus conference in 1984, the causal re-
lationship between cholesterol and heart disease may hold even if it is not
the case that lowering cholesterol levels lowers heart disease rate. We read
in the main document:
Our conclusion that reduction of blood cholesterol levels will re-
duce the rate of coronary heart disease is based partly on the ev-
idence for cause-and-effect presented above and partly on the di-
rect evidence from clinical trials noted below. (US Department of Health and Human Services a
1984)
At first glance, an answer to the interventional question seems to re-
quire results from trials. As rightly pointed out by many opponents of
the cholesterol hypothesis (Mccormick and Skrabanek, 1988; Mitchell, 1984;
McMichael, 1979), consistent results from trials were not available at their
time (at least until the results of the Coronary Primary Prevention Trial
were published in 1984, see section 3). In section 4.2, we discuss whether a
positive answer to the interventional question requires results from trials in
more detail.
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Even if lowering cholesterol in turn lowers hearth disease, it is not ipso
facto the case that mortality by causes other than heart disease is also low-
ered. At first glance, a definite answer to the question whether cholesterol
lowering is free of serious side effects required evidence that wasn’t available
until 1994, when results from the 4s trial became available (see section 3).
The Coronary Primary Prevention Trial (see section 3) seems to have,
for many, established that lowering cholesterol will lower heart mortality in
men aged 35-39 with no history of coronary disease and no signs of current
disease and that were already at high risk (total blood cholesterol level of 265
mg/dl or higher). It was by no means clear whether the trial in combination
with the rest of the evidence licenses the extrapolation of the result to other
groups like, for instance, to women.
Part of the historical disagreement on cholesterol may be due to the
fact that researchers had different questions in mind. A researcher, for
instance, rejecting the claim that the relationship between cholesterol and
heart disease is causal may highlight that the effect of lowering cholesterol
on lowering overall morality has not been established (see, for instance, the
reconstruction of McMichael’s position in section 3). While this is certainly
a valid point against recommending a population-wide cholesterol diet or
treatment with cholesterol lowering drugs, it is not relevant to the causal
question.
Part of the disagreement concerning the causal question above is due
to different uses of the concept ‘cause’. An important distinction exists
between the notions of proximal and distal causation. As discussed in sec-
tion 3, cardiologists were mainly concerned with proximate causes of disease:
these causes would provide the details of the biological processes responsible
for triggering symptoms of heart disease. By contrast, epidemiologist were
concerned with finding risk factors such as environmental exposures that
are associated with disease outcomes, regardless of the distance – temporal
or mechanistic connection – between the exposure and the disease outcome.
For instance, Mitchell in 1984 discusses many beliefs about cholesterol and
heart disease he thinks would be shown to be false by the year 2000 (Mitchell,
1984). One of those is that CHD is caused by atherosclerosis. Mitchell claims
that this is wrong because myocardial infarction and sudden death are rapid
events. According to him, thrombosis is the relevant cause, as the occur-
rence of thrombosis is the close proximate cause of infarction and similarly
rapidly developing events. To support the claim that atherosclerosis is in
the relevant sense a cause of infarction, one would have to show how exactly
atherosclerosis leads to sudden obstruction of blood flow similar enough to
thrombosis – i.e. one would have to establish the mechanism of plaque rup-
ture. From an epidemiological point of view – in which mechanistic details
are often deliberately black-boxed – similar relevance criteria do not apply.
Other authors seem to advocate a stronger concept of cause. They re-
quire, for instance, that a cause is the most relevant cause of its effect (or
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at least a cause associated with large effect-size) or that a cause leads de-
terministically to its effect. For instance, McCormick and Skrabanek seem
to advocate a deterministic concept of cause. According to them the effect
must inevitably follow the cause:
Even infectious diseases do not inevitably follow exposure to
pathogens, the necessary cause, because many other conditions
have to be satisfied before disease becomes manifest [. . . ]. Be-
cause these risk factors are simply associated with an altered
probability for the disease and have not been shown to have a
causal relation, the term should be dropped and replaced by
“risk marker”. (Mccormick and Skrabanek, 1988)
However, even if researchers had the same question in mind, substantial
disagreement remained.
4.2 Inference from the evidence: Establishing a causal claim
without trials?
At different stages of the discussion main researchers drew different conclu-
sions from the current evidence. Basically, in the cholesterol case, not one
single piece of evidence from a single source could be taken to be sufficient to
establish a causal claim, or to license a reasonable expectation about the re-
sult of an intervention. Critics rightly point out that each source of evidence
is subject to certain flaws (see section 3). The question about disagreement
is therefore also a question of amalgamating evidence, i.e., merging evidence
from different sources. Especially, conclusions obtained by consensus con-
ferences were often based on combining evidence from different sources. In
this section, we take a closer look at disagreement that concerned how to
combine evidence from different sources.
Some opponents of the cholesterol hypothesis pointed out that establish-
ing a causal claim requires results from interventional trials. For instance,
McCormick and Skrabanek claim that
While epidemiological studies may lead to the formulation of im-
portant hypotheses about the causes of coronary heart disease,
only experiment can prove causal relations. (Mccormick and Skrabanek,
1988)
In a similar vein Mitchell claims
Confronted with an association which could either be causal or
a marker, the only way forward is to mount an interventional
trial. Mitchell (1984)
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If consistent evidence from interventional trial is needed to establish
causality, then Mitchell and McCormick seem to be right in rejecting the
cholesterol hypothesis, as mentioned earlier in section 3. However, doubt
has been raised about this methodological principle by advocates of eviden-
tial pluralism. Evidential pluralism is the view according to which causal
claims, in medicine but also elsewhere, are typically established on the basis
of evidence of difference-making and of mechanism Russo and Williamson
(2007). Simply put, evidence of difference-making establishes appropriate
correlations between the putative cause(s) C and the putative effect(s) E.
Evidence of mechanism, instead, provides hints as to how C causes E. This
thesis is epistemological in character and does not reduce causation to any
of these evidential components, nor to their conjunction.
If the mechanism by which C is connected to E is sufficiently well es-
tablished, this could, in connection with other types of studies, provide
compelling reasons for a causal interpretation of the link between C and
E. Specifically, in the cholesterol case, if we have sufficient evidence about
cholesterol synthesis and metabolism, as well as its biochemical capacities,
then, together with observational and animal studies we should have strong
enough reasons for predicting the effect of an intervention that lowers choles-
terol on heart disease. The issue at stake here is not that different sources
of evidence point, independently, to the same causal relation. Instead, what
is at stake is that we need to amalgamate different sources of evidence so
that they together provide stronger support to a given causal claim. It
is in this sense that evidential pluralists have been using the metaphor of
‘reinforced concrete’, a composite material whose resistance is due to the
mutual support of steel and concrete, which resists different kinds of stress
(Clarke et al., 2014).
As we allude to the amalgamation of different types of evidence as a way
to arrive at more secure (causal) conclusions, our position bears important
similarities to another prominent analysis of pluralism in science, namely,
integrative pluralism as advocated by philosopher Sandra Mitchell (Mitchell,
2002, 2003). Before briefly presenting her view and further stressing points
of contacts between our views, it is important to emphasise one important
difference: our discussion considers pluralism with respect to sources of ev-
idence, while hers is about pluralism of modelling frameworks and explana-
tions. Mitchell’s analysis starts from the fact that, within the life sciences,
it is common to see a diversity of methods and models used to explain prop-
erties of a single target system. She then argues against a view according
to which different models are in competition only if they are pitched at the
same ‘level of analysis’, in the sense that they address the same explanation-
seeking question. In Mitchell’s example of the explanation the division of
labour in social insect colonies, the levels-of-analysis view would conclude
that models of (division of labour in terms of) colony-level adaptation are
not in competition with self-organization models of the same phenomenon.
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The former addresses a historical, phylogenetic question, while the latter
answers a how-question about the ontogeny of individual colony organiza-
tions. Mitchell then points out that this is not correct: as is the case with
the diverse explanations of colony organization, an explanation pitched at
a particular level of analysis may involve presuppositions that are incom-
patible with explanations at other levels, or may itself be incompatible with
presuppositions made by explanations at other levels. In Mitchell’s account,
the question then arises how to account for the heterogeneity of modelling
perspectives. Her answer is that such a plurality of models is expected in the
study of a complex system – all scientific representations are partial descrip-
tions of reality, and the very nature of complex systems requires that one
employ a number of modelling perspectives, each of which focus on a subset
of the causal factors involved in generating the behaviour of a complex sys-
tem. The ‘integration’ part of integrative pluralism in her account stands for
the following idea: given that different models are models of a single target,
they are not independent of each other in the way that the levels-of-analysis
framework suggests, but should instead ultimately be brought in line with
each other in order to obtain a fuller understanding of the target – that is
the integration. Mitchell’s main focus is thus on the integration of diverse
explanatory perspectives, not on the question of what sorts of evidence one
needs in order to establish the validity of these explanations, i.e. the valid-
ity of the causal ascriptions they make about the target phenomenon. By
contrast, our interest lies in establishing causal claims at a specific level,
e.g. the level of a population or of an individual, using evidence that is
heterogeneous or multifarious. For one thing, this means that evidence is
collected in different ways (e.g., by experimental or observational studies),
or refers to different levels of analysis (e.g., by observing distributions of dis-
ease in a population or studying the progression of a disease in an individual
patient), or comes from causally dissimilar sources such as animal models
and minimal laboratory systems.
To return to evidential pluralism in our sense, important institutions
that evaluated the evidence connecting heart disease with cholesterol in fact
combined different kinds of evidence to assess the cholesterol hypothesis.
For instance, in US Department of Health and Human Services and others
(1984) the acceptance of the cholesterol hypothesis was based on the follow-
ing evidence (see section 3):
• Genetic evidence: Investigating children with hypercholesterolemia;
• Animal Model Evidence;
• Epidemiological Evidence: Framingham and others, new trials like
Lipid research clinics coronary primary prevention trial;
• Mechanism of LDL discovered by Brown and Goldstein.
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An opponent of the cholesterol-hypothesis may doubt the credibility of
either piece of evidence (see section 3 for flaws associated with each type of
evidence). But even if all of those studies could be discredited individually,
it does not follow that one can discredit them in conjunction. Each of the
studies provides evidence missing in other pieces of evidence, which is the
core idea behind evidential pluralism. Indeed, Steinberg sees as main reason
for the long lasting controversy:
Most important of all, resistance to the need to synthesize evi-
dence of several different kinds-epidemiological evidence, exper-
imental observations in animals, genetic evidence, clinical obser-
vations, and clinical trial data – in evaluating the true strength of
the lipid hypothesis. The early clinical trial results while weaker
than might have been desired, were nevertheless impressive if
they were weighted in the context of all the other available lines
of evidence. (Steinberg, 2007, p.197)
4.3 Evaluation of clues and evidence
In section 3, we briefly described various historically important examples
from the overall evidence base for the cholesterol hypothesis, including ex-
periments on model organisms, mechanistic studies, epidemiological studies,
as well as clinical trials employing dietary or pharmacological interventions.
Different authors often disagreed on the correct interpretation of these stud-
ies in terms of how much weight should be given to different types of evidence
when attempting to establish conclusions about causality. For instance,
different authors had wildly varying views concerning the applicability of
results from model organism research to humans. But aside from the dis-
agreement about the interpretation of particular results, there were also
controversies regarding the quality of the evidence. Crucially, these debates
focused on trial evidence commonly assumed to be required for demonstrat-
ing causality beyond doubt. As some of these controversies concerned studies
that have later become canonized as key pieces of evidence in favor of the
cholesterol hypothesis, we mention some famous critiques below.
The first successful trial employing a (non-statin) pharmacological inter-
vention was the Lipid Research Clinics Coronary Primary Prevention trial
(LRCCPPT), mentioned in section 3, which treated hypercholesterolemic
men with cholestyramine. The study has become one of the prime exam-
ples of a demonstration of the clinical benefits of cholesterol-lowering, while
the most widely raised critical issue has to do with external validity. All
subjects in the study were men and, almost certainly, genetically hyperc-
holesterolemic, which raised concerns about the possibility of extrapolating
the results to the wider population. Nonetheless, some commentaries raised
significant critiques considering the quality of the study itself.
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In an editorial to Nutrition Today, George V. Mann launched a harsh
critique on the cholesterol hypothesis, singling out the cholestyramine trial as
one key piece of faulty evidence (Mann, 1985). Mann accused the authors of
the LRCCPPT of bad research practices; of choosing statistical techniques
in light of what is most likely to produce a positive result, rather than
according to a predetermined study design (Mann, 1985, p. 13). Mann’s
critique was based on an analysis by Kronmal (1985). Kronmal had pointed
out that in describing the design of the trial, the authors state that a p-
value below .01 in a one-tailed test is required to licence the rejection of the
null hypothesis, given the design of the experiment. However, in a separate
article reporting the results of the trial, the significance level used was .05.
According to Kronmal’s reanalysis of the data, the trial would not have
reached a significant result in a .01 one-tailed test, or in a two-tailed test
using the usual .05 cutoff for significance (Kronmal, 1985).
The authors of the trial also performed within-group analyses for both
the cholestyramine treatment group and the placebo groups. These, too,
showed a correlation between cholesterol levels and the measured CHD end-
points. Kronmal points out that some proportion of the correlation might
be due to the way the authors had handled missing data points. Each of
the test subjects was examined once in four months. If a subject failed to
show up to two subsequent examinations, his baseline LDL level was used
as the value of those month’s measurements. Now, consider a situation in
which a subject fails to show up to (many) examinations because they had
experienced clinical events associated with CHD, and had failed to follow
the treatment plan for this very reason. Kronmal writes:
If such an association between the precursors of the CHD event
and withdrawal from therapy exists, then the results of the rule
used would tend to make those who have a CHD event, as a
group, have a lower mean reduction in LDL-C level than those
who did not have a CHD event (Kronmal, 1985, p. 2093).
A single example is of course not sufficient to represent the breadth
of all the debate about the quality of evidence. We merely intend this
example as an illustration that disagreement took place on two levels: one
concerning the interpretation of results that were largely agreed upon as
being well established, and the other concerning the quality of particular
studies, i.e. whether or not a particular result can be taken as well established
in the first place. These questions are often intertwined in practice, but
it is nonetheless possible and analytically useful to distinguish them. A
community of researchers might for example be in complete agreement about
some result being well established in experimental animals or in a particular
study population, yet disagree sharply about the relevance of the result for
clinical applications.
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4.4 Evidence of mechanism
We previously introduced the core idea of evidential pluralism. Central
to this is the use of evidence of mechanisms to establish causal claims.
This may be a source of important disagreement. What is at stake here
is not merely whether scientists genuinely disagree about the details of the
mechanism leading from C to E – in our case, from cholesterol to heart
disease. Instead even when asking one single question (does cholesterol
cause heart disease? ) there may be different mechanisms at stake, and this
is where disagreement about the evidence may lie.
To see how this is possible, one should note that the term ‘mechanism’
can be understood in two ways. On the one hand, by ‘mechanism’, we may
mean a concrete causal process in the world: the totality of entities and
activities, whatever they are, that somehow participate in bringing about
some phenomenon. On the other hand, ‘mechanism’ may mean something
like a diagram one finds in a molecular biology textbook: a rather abstract,
truncated representation of some aspects of the total process. These theoret-
ical descriptions of mechanisms are not designed to capture all the features
of the concrete mechanism in the world. Rather, they represent information
about particular aspects of the concrete mechanism, for the purposes of ad-
dressing particular explanatory tasks and for guiding further research. Our
evidence of mechanisms comes from research programmes organized around
elaborating such theoretical mechanisms (Bechtel and Richardson, 2010).
When studying a complex phenomenon such as heart disease, there are
often many theoretical mechanisms that apply to the phenomenon. Thus,
there is no single research programme that we could consult to get evidence
of the total, concrete mechanism that leads from the causes of heart disease
to its clinical manifestation. Instead, we have patchy evidence of many
theoretical mechanisms, operating at different levels of organization. In
principle, one can reach different conclusions about the level of mechanistic
support for a given causal claim by selectively attending to parts of this
mosaic of mechanisms. This is interesting for our purposes, as possible
disagreement here considers evidential relevance – what kinds of evidence
one should gather and consider, and what can be ignored – rather than the
quality of the evidence, or how strongly it warrants causal inferences.
One might ask: which mechanisms should one attend to in order to
answer the question does high cholesterol cause heart disease? There may
be no unambiguous answer. The connection between hypercholesterolemia
and heart disease is a complex phenomenon – the processes linking the
cause to the effect involve operations at the levels of metabolism, immune
system, vascular system, and various gene regulation and cell signaling sys-
tems. Whole subfields of biomedical research are devoted to theorising about
particular aspects of the global mechanism that mediates the dependency
between cholesterol and heart disease. Research in each of these respective
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fields is organised around elaborating specific theoretical mechanism tem-
plates. It is evident that the whole of research on the causes and effects of
high cholesterol is not even considering the mechanism of heart disease in
the sense of a concrete constellation of all the entities that are involved in
the process.
For example, as was mentioned in section 3, in the discussion of Ross and
Glomset’s endothelial injury theory, cardiologists’ skepticism towards the
cholesterol hypothesis might have been due to their particular disciplinary
focus. This is very plausible given the structure and uses of mechanism
concepts in science. What Ross and Glomset were able to do was to give
a theoretical description of many properties of the advanced atherosclerotic
lesion in a way that satisfies the strictures of mechanistic explanation. That
cholesterol is downgraded as a background condition in Ross and Glomset’s
explanation is a consequence of applying a specific mechanism template
of cell signaling: it does not follow that if Ross and Glomset are right,
then cholesterol has only a minor role in the aetiology of heart disease.
The importance of cholesterol becomes evident once one recognizes that the
early, clinically silent fatty streak is a background condition required for the
development of the advanced lesion, and cholesterol has a crucial role in the
development of the fatty streak.
Our discussion of some of the loci and reasons for disagreement in the choles-
terol wars – different problem definitions, evidence, evidence amalgamation,
and evidence of mechanisms – should make clear that there isn’t a ‘unified’ or
‘coherent’ theory of hypercholesterolemia. This, rather than being a special
case, is quite common in medicine, and indeed across the sciences. Conse-
quently, the move of shifting the focus from theories to modelling practices
should liberate the traditional debate on inconsistency and open up a whole
path of research that investigates disagreement, in its several dimensions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we addressed the question of scientific disagreement, specifi-
cally the question of which factors may create and sustain a dissensus about
a particular problem within a scientific community. On the one hand, our
discussion follows up the first step made in a certain strand in the litera-
ture on inconsistencies in science and broadens the debate by considering
the role of modelling practices, and of modellers, and not just the logic of
inconsistent theories. We made a firm choice in abandoning terms such as
‘inconsistency’ or ‘inconsistent’, in favour of ‘(dis)agreement’. Disagreement
is in fact broader in scope than inconsistency: opinions about hypotheses,
theories, procedures, or results may diverge and yet not be (logically) incon-
sistent. On the other hand, we consider this to be an important opportunity
also to broaden the scope of the debate on evidential pluralism. Simply put,
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this is the view that to establish a causal claim one needs multiple sources
of evidence. By and large, evidential pluralism has been dominated by the
question of how to establish a causal claim, using multifarious evidence. In
this paper, we tackled the question of where and why, in the scientific pro-
cess, disagreement may arise, thus hindering the establishment of causal
claims.
Section 2 provided a theoretical account of disagreement, including epis-
temic, socio-political, or psychological factors. We considered loci & reasons
for disagreement at a very general level. We reconstructed the scientific pro-
cess as a special case of problem solving and we argued that both loci and rea-
sons of disagreement are manifold. In sections 3 and 4, we illustrated the ‘loci
& reasons’ for disagreement using an episode from history and philosophy of
the health sciences: the studies on hypercholesterolemia and its relation to
heart disease. Our historical reconstruction shows that many of the loci and
of reasons of disagreement discussed in section 2 played an important role in
the controveries surrounding the relationship between cholesterol and heart
disease. Indeed, after the first animal trials, it took nearly 80 years for the
medical community to reach consensus that high blood cholesterol is a cause
of heart disease. Section 3 retraces major breakthroughs in establishing that
high cholesterol is a cause for heart disease. Among those were results from
animal experiments, studies of familial hypercholesterolemia, observational
studies, mechanistic evidence and trial results. Each of these sources of
evidence, however, suffers from certain limitations. This fact contributed
substantially to disagreement concerning the cholesterol-heart disease link.
For instance, part of the disagreement was due to the fact that there were
at least five different questions guiding the research. Also, scientists were
working with different concepts of cause or disagreed about the quality of
the available data and about their interpretation. The major reason for the
longstanding controversy was, however, the reluctance of researchers to inte-
grate evidence from different sources. This is an important point, given the
current attention of the medical and philosophical communities to questions
about evidence amalgamation.
Our account of the loci & reasons for disagreement and the discussion of
the ‘cholesterol wars’ ultimately lend further support to evidential pluralism.
Because a community may disagree for different reasons and at various stages
of the scientific process, disagreement may be overcome by looking at all the
available evidence, rather than at one piece at every one time. Our point,
at this stage, is mainly epistemic.
It is important to note, however, that we did not try to answer why de
facto leading scientists disagreed on the relationship of cholesterol and heart
disease. In particular, we did not consider whether the course of history is
best explained by epistemic or by pragmatic factors. We did, for instance,
not aim to reconstruct the debate from a socio-psycho-political point of
view. Instead, we mainly considered epistemic reasons for disagreement.
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As explained in the Introduction, this is not meant to mark an order of
importance or relevance. We agree that to get a full picture of disagreement
in the ‘cholesterol wars’ (as well as in other cases) reasons for disagreement
other than epistemic must be taken into account. For instance, one pressing
question to address is whether leading scientists (especially opponents of the
cholesterol hypothesis) had an undeclared conflict of interest in the form
of opinions about particular diets, or through receiving funding by certain
companies. Another crucial question to address is whether, and why, leading
scientists disagreed about the safety concerns of lowering cholesterol by diet
or drugs.
In sum, many issues are yet to be addressed. We lacked space to discuss
all the loci & reasons identified in section 2; we mainly focused on different
problem definitions, on evidence of mechanisms, and on aggregating evidence
from different sources. Although this contribution is far from exhausting the
numerous and complex questions about scientific disagreement and, for the
matter, about disagreement in the cholesterol wars, we hope to have opened
up a promising line of research. Our contribution, we hope, will help in
the discussion of controversies of the (distant or recent) past, and also of
contemporary controversies. From the Zika outbreak to the anti-vaccine
movement, from the economic crisis to climate change, there is urgent need
to understand why consensus is not always secured and how this impacts
policy decisions.
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